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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES:
A FOCUS ON OUR
INVISIBLE JUDICIARY
Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
The administrative law judge (ALJ)' is the central figure in formal
administrative adjudication. There were 1,146 ALJs employed by
twenty-nine federal agencies as of June 1980.' One indication of the
importance of ALJs as lawmakers and law appliers is suggested by the
fact that they outnumber by two to one the corps of United States
district court judges who preside over the nation's entire federal civil
and criminal trial docket.'
Administrative law judges are employed by executive departments
and independent agencies5 to conduct hearings and make decisions in
*Senior Staff Attorney, Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of the
United States. The article is a modification of an earlier chapter that appeared in
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS-
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978, 7-24 (1980). It represents only the analysis of the
author and has not been reviewed or approved by the Conference or any of its standing
committees.
'The newsletter of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference expressed
displeasure with the proliferation of the acronym "ALJ" (August 1979 newsletter). It is
used in this article solely for the sake of brevity.
'Information obtained from Office of Administrative Law Judges, OPM, June 1980.
See also Hearings on H.R. 6768 Before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1980), (testimony of Margery Waxman, general counsel, U.S. Office
of Personnel Management) stating that out of 11 27judges, 43 were women and 54 were
"minorities."
'See the table in the appendix.
4As ofJune 1980 there were 516 authorized federal district courtjudgeships, 484 filled
and 32 vacancies. One hundred seventeen new positions were created by the Omnibus
Judgeship Act of 1978. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANN. REP. p. 2.
5The term "agency" as used in this article includes executive departments, agencies
within such departments, (e.g., Social Security Administration) and independent agen-
cies.
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proceedings in which administrative determinations must be based on
the records of trial-type hearings. An ALJ's decision may be, and often
is, the final decision of the agency without further proceedings if there
is no appeal to, or review on the motion of, the agency.6 A mere listing
of some of the types of matters acted upon by ALJs shows how impor-
tant they are to our daily lives and to the national economy: licensure
and route certification of transportation by air, rail, motor vehicle or
ship; licensure of radio and television broadcasting; establishment of
rates for gas, electrical, communication, and transportation services;
compliance with federal standards relating to interstate trade, labor-
management relations, advertising, communications, consumer prod-
ucts, food and drugs, banking, corporate mergers, and antitrust; reg-
ulation of health and safety in mining, transportation, and industry;
regulation of trading in securities, commodities, and futures; adjudica-
tion of claims relating to social security benefits, workers' compensa-
tion, international trade, and mining; and many other matters.7
When compared with the role of judges of the federal courts, the
role of ALJs in our governmental system is less visible, and, as one
would guess, less well understood. The federal judge is, after all, the
personification of the judicial branch of the government: a robed
authority figure who can demand and receive respect and obeisance
even from presidents. Federal judges are guaranteed life tenure by the
Constitution; there is little reason to question their independence. The
significance of their decisions, which are regularly published and wide-
ly accessible, is clearly comprehensible within the context of the famil-
iar three-tier structure of the federal court system (i.e., district courts,
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court). ALJs, on the other hand, in
spite of being called judges and functioning as such, are subject to
doubts about their independence due in part to their employment
status as agency personnel. Furthermore, few agencies systematically
publish decisions of their ALJs, and the significance of an ALJ's "deci-
sion" as a determinant of his agency's decision or final action varies
markedly from agency to agency.
The position of administrative law judge (formerly called "hearing
examiner"' ) did not even exist until the Administrative Procedure Act
65 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976).
7For a comprehensive listing of categories of cases presided over by ALJs, see [1980]
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS--
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978.
8The APA originally used the term "examiner." This was changed to "hearing examin-
er" in the 1966 codification of the Act. After a long campaign by the examiners, the title
was changed to administrative law judge by the Civil Service Commission on August 19,
1972. The APA was subsequently so amended in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-251.
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(APA) was enacted in 1946. Prior to the APA,9 there were no reliable
safeguards to ensure the objectivity and judicial capability of presid-
ing officers in formal administrative proceedings. Ordinarily these
officers were subordinate employees chosen by the agencies, and the
power of the agencies to control and influence such personnel made
questionable the contention of any agency that its proceedings assured
fundamental fairness. Furthermore, the role of the presiding officer in
an agency's decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would
ignore the officer's decisions without giving reasons, and enter their
own de novo decisions. The APA was designed to correct these condi-
tions. Reshaping the role of the "hearing examiner" was a crucial
precondition to both of these basic reforms.
The APA spelled out the powers and duties of these so-called ex-
aminers as presiding officers.' ° By giving the Civil Service Commission
the authority to determine their qualifications and compensation, the
APA attempted to insure their competence, impartiality and inde-
pendence. The basic structure of the 1946 Act remains unchanged
today.
As to the independence issue, the Act lodges in the Office of Person-
nel Management (OPM, the successor of the Civil Service Commission)
exclusive authority for the initial examination and certification for
selection of ALJs. In addition, ALJs receive compensation as pre-
scribed only by OPM, independently of agency recommendations or
ratings," and they can be removed by the agency which employs them
only when good cause is established before the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board after opportunity for hearing. The APA also requires that
the ALJs' functions be conducted in an impartial manner" and pro-
vides that if a disqualification petition is filed against an ALJ in any
case, the agency must determine that issue on the record, and as part of
the decision in that case. 4 The Act also prescribes that an ALJ may not
be responsible to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency. 5 This "separa-
tion of functions" requirement is designed to prevent the investigative
'The following discussion is derived from Macy, The APA and the Hearing
Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED. BAR. J. 351, 355 (1967).
105 U.S.C., § 556(c) (1980). For a comprehensive look at the duties of an ALJ, see
RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES(19 7 4), and Zwerdling, Reflections on the
Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. REV. 9 (1973).
"5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1976).
125 U.S.C. § 7521 (1976), 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (1980), 44 Fed. Reg. 3946, 3953 (1979).
135 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976).
141d.
.55 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976).
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or prosecutorial arm of an agency from controlling a hearing or
influencing the ALJ. Finally, to insure that the ALJs are well insulated
from improper agency pressure and controls, the APA contains two
other provisions designed to make the ALJ at least semi-independent
of the employing agency: ALJs are to be assigned to their cases in
rotation so far as is practicable; and they may not perform their duties
inconsistently with their roles as ALJs.1
6
I. SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF ALJs
Since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, the U.S. Civil
Service Commission (now OPM) has been exclusively responsible for
the initial examination, certification for selection, and compensation of
ALJs. Exercising these responsibilities has not been an easy task. The
story of the controversy that surrounded the commission's early
attempts to administer the examination and selection of qualified ALJs
and the maintenance of an eligibility roster is an interesting one, but it
is too lengthy to be retold here. 7 What is of more immediate interest is
how the current and future members of the corps of ALJs have
attained or will attain their positions.
There are several important interrelated facets of the selection and
appointment process. The Office of Personnel Management through
its Office of Administrative Law Judges administers the recruitment,
evaluation, and selection of those eligible to be appointed as ALJs.
OPM has determined the minimum level of qualifying experience
which an individual must have to be eligible. In addition OPM con-
ducts interviews, administers a test of writing ability, evaluates the
qualifying experience of all applicants who meet the minimum experi-
ence requirements, and scores each of them on a scale of 100 points.
Those who score 80 points or above become "eligibles" and are ranked
(highest scores at the top) on registers maintained by OPM from which
the agencies make their appointments. The office maintains two reg-
isters; one at the GS-16 grade level, the other at GS-15. This is done
because OPM has created ALJ positions at both of these levels. ALJ
positions in a majority of those agencies which employ ALJs (including
most of the major agencies engaged in economic regulation) are at the
GS-16 level. 8 The positions in the remaining four agencies (including
'65 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976).
17The definitive account, with rich Civil Service Commission documentation, is found
in Macy, supra note 9, at 363-78. Mr. Macy was then the chairman of the commission.
'
8One constraint upon the number of GS-16 ALJ positions authorized by OPM is that
there is a statutory ceiling on the number of "supergrade" positions (i.e., GS-16, GS-17
and GS-18 positions) in the federal government. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 5108(a) (Supp. 11979),
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the Social Security Administration which employs over half of all ALJs)
are at the GS-15 level.'
9
Before considering the entire selection and appointment process in
more detail, it is necessary to note the importance of two complicating
factors. The first such factor results from the applicability of the
Veterans Preference Act 20 to the process. The Act (applicable to all
competitive civil service jobs in the federal government) provides that
veterans of the armed services shall receive preference points in addi-
tion to their scored ratings. This, as will be shown, tends markedly to
enhance the ranking of veterans on both the GS-15 and GS-16 ALJ
registers in relation to nonveterans. The second complicating factor is
the office's policy of permitting agencies to appoint eligibles who are
not at the top of the register if the eligibles possess requisite specialized
experience. Most of the agencies employing GS-16 ALJs utilize this
procedure, known as "selective certification," and its impact upon the
appointment of GS-16 ALJs is therefore crucial.
A. Evaluation by the Office of ALJs
The Office of Personnel Management has set forth the minimum
qualifying experience which must be possessed by an applicant as well
as the general rating factors considered by the Office of ALJs in the
determination of the applicant's eligibility and score."
In order to qualify as an ALJ, the applicant must be an attorney and
have seven or more years of "qualifying experience," at least two of
which must be within the seven-year period immediately preceding the
date of the application. Qualifying experience means primarily (1)
judicial experience; (2) the preparation, trial, hearing or review of
formal administrative law cases at the federal, state, or local level; or (3)
the preparation and trial or appeal of cases in courts of unlimited or
original jurisdiction."
authorizing the director of OPM, at his discretion, to establish 10,777 supergrade
positions. A provision in this section reserving 240 positions at the GS-16 level and 9
positions at the GS-17 level for ALJs was deleted by Pub. L. No. 95-454.
'"The other three agencies that employ ALJs classified (by OPM) at GS-15 are the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Department of HUD, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of
Interior and Labor employ both GS-15s and GS-16s. Chief ALJs at agencies with more
than 10 ALJs are classified at GS-17.
2 Veterans Preference Act of 1944, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309, 3317, 3318
(1976).
21U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, ANNOUNCEMENT No. 318 (reissued 1979). This
21-page pamphlet announces the examination for ALJ positions and is available from
OPM's Office of ALJs.22The element of general trial experience liberalized the prior standard and was
adopted in response to a recommendation by the Administrative Conference, Adminis-
trative Conference of the U.S. Recommendation 69-9, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (1980).
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The ALJ applicant must consent to having inquiries (referred to by
OPM as "vouchers") sent to about 20 individuals having personal
knowledge of the applicant's experience, professional abilities, and
qualifications (e.g., supervisors, judges, law partners, co-counsel and
opposing counsel). The applicant also must demonstrate writing ability
by preparing, under OPM supervision, a sample opinion which is
examined for clarity, conciseness and legal soundness. Finally, the
applicant must participate in an oral interview before a special panel
composed of an official of OPM, a practicing attorney, and an official
of an administrative agency.23
To become an eligible, and be placed on either the GS-15 or GS-16
register, an applicant must score at least 80 points on a scale of 100 in
the final grading of the application. Applications are first screened to
determine whether the applicant has the requisite minimal qualifying
experience. Only those who do are graded. The applicant's qualifying
experience may then be scored up to 60 points based upon the level of
difficulty, complexity, responsibility and importance of at least one
year of his experience. This score is computed by the Office of ALJs
from an internal manual which it has assembled over the years contain-
ing numerical scores for all anticipated types of experiences. The
computation is also affected by the civil service rating sought by the
applicant; his experience will probably be assigned fewer points if he
applies for eligibility at GS-16 than if he seeks eligibility at GS-15.
In addition to a score for qualifying experience, the applicant is
assigned up to 40 points based upon the evaluation of professional
qualifications contained in the applicant's vouchers. The staff of the
Office of ALJs scores the evaluations on a specially designed "factor
rating sheet," giving most weight to evaluations in vouchers submitted
by individuals who are in the best position to evaluate the applicant
objectively. Applicants who have scored at least 80 points on the basis
of their combined scores for qualifying experience and the vouchers
are rated as tentatively eligible and are asked to prepare a sample
opinion and to appear before the special interviewing panel. After the
panel completes the interview and reviews the writing sample, it may
recommend an adjustment of the tentative eligibility rating score,
although in practice adjustments are minor (nearly always less than five
points). The director of the Office of ALJs may, in his discretion,
accept, reject, or modify the recommendation. The former director
"
5The attorney is usually, but not always, nominated by the Administrative Law Section
of the ABA. The agency official is generally a chief ALJ but sometimes a board member,
commissioner, or general counsel. Interview with Charles Dullea, former director of the
Office of ALJs (February 1976).
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estimated that about 72 percent of all applicants are rated ineligible.
Approximately 32 percent of all applicants fail to pass the threshold
because they lack one or more of the minimum experience require-
ments, about 36 percent fail to establish tentative eligibility by scoring
below 79 points after the first two ratings are totaled, and 4 percent
have their score lowered below 80 after evaluation by a special panel. 4
Individuals determined eligible for listing on either of the two ALJ
registers are ranked in order of their scores with the highest scores at
the top of the list, and appointments are made by the individual
agencies from these registers. However, the agencies' appointment
power is restricted by a statutory requirement known as the "rule of
three" which is applicable to all competitive civil service jobs in the
federal government. Under this requirement, when an agency re-
quests a list of eligibles, OPM must certify enough names from the top
of the register to permit the agency to consider at least three names per
appointment to each vacancy. The agency is then obliged to make its
selection from those three who have the highest scores and are actually
available for appointment.25 As will be shown, the Veterans Preference
Act tends to make the "rule of three" even more restrictive on agency
choice. However, the operation of OPM's selective certification policy,
in effect, removes the restrictiveness with respect to most appoint-
ments from the GS-16 register.
B. Veterans Preference
As explained above, those eligible for appointment as ALJs are
ranked on the two registers maintained by OPM in order of their
scores. However, the impact of the Veterans Preference Act on register
rankings is crucial. The Act provides that an eligible applicant (appli-
cant with an earned score of 80 or more) who meets certain require-
ments as a wartime veteran of the armed services is entitled to 5 (10 in
the case of a disabled veteran) additional points above his scored
rating.26 Since there is only a 20-point spread on scores among all ALJ
eligibles (from 80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 10 veterans preference
points to any score can change by many places an eligible's ranking on
the register. Statistics compiled in February 1974 by the Office of ALJs
241d. It is interesting to note that the rating process received its first court challenge in
March 1973. The complainant alleged that the Commission's failure to find him qualified
was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. The district court entered judgment for
the Commission, and the 7th Circuit, in an unpublished order, affirmed. Bromberg v.
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 75-1485 (7th Cir., submitted December 19, 1975).
255 U.S.C. §§ 3317, 3318 (1976).
265 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309 (1976).
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show that of the top 60 eligibles on the GS-15 register, 9 were 10-point
veterans, 42 were 5-point veterans, and only 9 had no veteran status.
(Of the remaining 98 eligibles on the register, 45 were 5-point veterans
and 53 were nonveterans.) The pattern was similar in the GS-16
register (although the importance of the rankings on this register is
lessened considerably by selective certification) where 58 of the 177
eligibles were nonveterans, and only 15 of those were in the top 100.27
The Veterans Preference Act also affects the operation of the "rule of
three" due to its restrictions upon an agency's passing over an eligible
who has veterans preference to select a nonpreference eligible.28 This
means that the agency will have little choice as to whom it will appoint
among the eligibles certified by OPM in instances in which the first
ranked eligible of those certified to the agency has veterans preference
and the remainder do not; the agency must normally select the veter-
an. Actual selection statistics confirm this. OPM has testified that from
1970 to 1979, of the 793 ALJs appointed, 593 (74.8 percent) were
veterans. 9
The impact of veterans preference on the register ranking combined
with the "rule of three" has led to criticism of the ALJ selection system
as keeping many outstanding candidates, especially women, at the
bottom of the register and as discouraging others from even applying."
The Administrative Conference has recommended that both the extra
points and the selection preference requirement for veterans be re-
pealed with respect to the certification and selection of ALJs, and that
agencies be permitted to appoint an ALJ from among the highest ten
ranked eligibles who are on the register at the time of selection.,'
17The statistics are found in the report of a subcommittee of the LaMacchia Committee
(discussed in the text at note 50). REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON RECRUITMENT, QUALIFICA-
TION, CERTIFICATION, AND APPOINTMENT, (1974) 47-48 [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT]. It has recently been reported that 49 of the top 50 people on the GS- 16 register
are veterans. Legal Times of Washington, June 2, 1980, at 32.
285 U.S.C. § 3318(b) (1976).
'Waxman testimony, supra note 2 at 9.
0SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT. supra note 27, at 49-50, 65. The full committee did not accept
the subcommittee's recommendation that the Veterans Preference Act be amended to
eliminate its application to the selection of ALJs. See also the discussion in Park, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION No. 17, 1 ACUS REP. 381,
404-08 (1969).
"ACUS Recommendation 69-9(A)(4) ("Recruitment and Selection of Hearing Ex-
aminers . . ."), 1 CFR § 305.69-9(A)(4) (1980). In August 1976, the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates adopted a resolution recommending that ALJs be
exempted from the provisions of the Veterans Preference Act.
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C. Selective Certification
As intimated above, many agencies have sought to avoid the restric-
tions upon their appointment of ALJs through the procedure of "selec-
tive certification." Using this process, an agency, upon a showing of
necessity and with the prior approval of OPM, is permitted to appoint
specially certified eligibles without regard to their ranking in relation to
other eligibles on the register who lack the special certification. For
example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has ar-
ranged with OPM for special certification of eligibles who can show:
[t]wo years of experience in the preparation, presentation, or hearing of
formal cases, or in making decisions on the basis of the record of such
hearings, originating before governmental regulatory bodies at the Federal,
state, or local level, in the field of communications law."
Suppose that four individuals on the GS-16 register were certified as
having these special qualifications and their rankings on the register
were 15, 31,68, and 95, respectively. When the FCC wished to appoint
an ALJ, OPM would send it a list containing the names of the top three
selectively certified eligibles (numbers 15, 31, and 68). The FCC could
then choose from among those three, although the Veterans Prefer-
ence Act's prohibition against passing over a veteran to select a non-
veteran would still apply. Without selective certification, if the FCC
were limited to picking new appointees from the top of the register,
those ranked 15, 31, and 68 could not be considered, and the agency
might not be able to consider for appointment an eligible candidate
who possessed special qualifications for the particular position.
The result of this selective certification procedure is to establish, in
effect, separate registers for those eligibles who have specialized ex-
perience. Announcement No. 318 lists the following agencies as uti-
lizing selective certification for appointees from the GS-16
register:" Department of Agriculture, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Federal Communications Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Department of Labor, Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, National Labor Relations Board, and Securities and Exchange
Commission. Only three agencies utilize selective certification for
appointment from the GS-15 register: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Social Security Administration (positions in Puerto Rico
SU.S. Office of Personnel Management, Announcement No. 318 (emphasis added).
(See note 21, supra, at 19). The special qualifications for all agencies utilizing selective
certification are set forth in the announcement.
"Id. at 19-21.
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only) and U.S. Coast Guard. The possible benefits of selective certifica-
tion to the agencies which have arranged for it are obvious, and those
agencies have in fact utilized it extensively. A study made for the Civil
Service Commission in 1974 reported that "approximately 82 percent
of the ALJs in the agencies using selective certification attained their
positions through its use.13 4 In fiscal years 1975 to 1979, 83 of the 98
appointments from the GS-16 register were selectively certified. 5
The practice of selective certification has been the subject of criticism
on the grounds that it severely limits opportunities for generalist
applicants and that it leads to "inbreeding" among an agency's ALJs
through biasing the selection process in favor of the agency's own staff
attorneys who are most likely to meet the specialized experience
criteria.3 6 A study done for the Administrative Conference in 1969
reported that in the preceding five-year period, 52 of 66 ALJs
appointed by the agencies utilizing selective certification had been
previously employed on the staffs of those agencies. 7 There is no
reason to think that the effect is less prevalent today.
Whether inbreeding actually poses a problem, beyond appearances,
is however, debatable. One agency which relies heavily upon selective
certification, the National Labor Relations Board, steadfastly continues
to defend the board's need to utilize the practice and maintains that the
practicing labor-management bar also supports its retention.", In reg-
ulatory agencies, on the other hand, where a pro-enforcement attitude
may more strongly pervade, the judges' agency background may be a
matter of greater concern to the practicing bar.3
Selective certification does not apply solely to government attorneys,
of course: attorneys in private practice have the same opportunity to
be specially certified as do agency staff attorneys. However, it appears
that private attorneys who have specialized expertise in law practice
within areas of ALJ selective certification have little interest in forsak-
ing their practice to become ALJs. The percentage of private attorneys
on the GS-16 register has fluctuated in recent years," but very few
"LaMacchia Committee Report, REPORTOFTTHE COMMITTEEON THE STUDYOF THE UTILIZA-
TION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWJUDGES, 12 (1974). See note 27, supra.
35Information obtained from OPM, Office of ALJs, March 1980.
'SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 37. See generally Miller, The Vice of Selective
Certification in the Appointment of Hearing Examiners, 20 AD. L. REV. 477 (1968).
57Park, supra note 30, at 396.
"
8Hearings on S.262 and Related Bills Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 286 (Part 1 1980) (testimony of John H. Fanning).
39See Statement of John T. Miller on behalf of the Federal Energy Bar Association,
Hearings, supra note 2, page 111.
4 See note 22, supra, and accompanying text. On July 1, 1967, only 20 percent of the
attorneys on the register were in private practice. See Miller, supra note 36, at 478-79 n. 1.
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private attorneys listed on the register are specially certified. In March
1980 there were 220 eligibles on the GS-16 register; twenty-three were
private attorneys and only two were specially certified.4'
It seems clear that selective certification represents a response by
OPM to agencies' complaints about the restrictions upon their power to
appoint ALJs with particularized expertise. The policy does strike a
sort of balance with the restrictiveness of the applicable provisions of
the Veterans Preference Act and the "rule of three," but whether it
strikes an optimum balance, whether it enhances the quality or produc-
tivity of the ALJs, and whether it unduly discriminates against "gener-
alist" eligibles remain much debated questions. The agencies utilizing
selective certification generally favor its continuation, generalist eligi-
bles oppose it, and others have urged its modification.
I share the Administrative Conference's belief that the objective of
selective certification could be achieved without closing the door to
highly qualified generalists by changing the process of ALJ certifica-
tion and selection. Under its recommendation, eligibles would be
awarded extra rating points for specialized experience of the kind now
recognized for selective certification; a pool of the ten, rather than
three, highest ranking eligibles on the register would be certified for
agency selection; and, by amendment of the Veterans Preference Act,
the agency would be free to select any eligible in the certified pool even
if there were a higher-rated veteran in the pool.42
D. Recruitment
The range of choice for agencies in selecting ALJs depends in part
upon the overall composition of the registers of eligibles. This in turn
depends in part upon recruitment of applicants. As mentioned, many
fewer private attorneys tend to apply than do federal agency lawyers.
One can only assume that the limited salary potential for ALJs is a
major factor in this. ALJs' salaries like those of other top governmental
officers are limited by a statutory ceiling. As of October 1980 a GS-15's
salary ranged from $44,547 to the ceiling of $50,112 and a GS-16 was
at the ceiling." Apparently this salary level is not high enough to attract
many specialized practitioners from the private bar. Indeed as far back
as 1974, the then director of the Office of ALJs expressed the opinion
By January 1, 1974, that figure had risen to 34 percent. SUBCOMMIT-FEE REPORT, supra note
27, at 42. In February 1976 the figure was 32 percent (42 of 180), but in March 1980, the
percentage was only 10.5.
4 Information obtained from OPM, Office of ALJs, March 1980. One of the two was
specially certified because of prior government service.
4 2ACUS Recommendation 69-9(A)(2); I CFR 305.69-9(A)(2) and (A)(4).
4 See E.O. 12248, 45 Fed. Reg. 69, 201 (1980).
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that ALJ service was also gradually losing its appeal to specially qual-
ified agency staff attorneys in relation to the more lucrative lure of
private practice. 4 The Office of ALJs has the responsibility for recruit-
ment as well as for examination and selection, and it can therefore
tailor its recruitment effort according to the agencies' needs and the
interests of practicing attorneys. For the most part, the office has
effected its recruitment through dissemination of Announcement No.
318, correspondence with bar associations and law schools, press re-
leases, and speeches by the director." However, this recruitment effort
has largely been limited to general recruitment, i.e., solicitation of
applicants for positions on the general registers. (Most of the efforts in
recent years have been directed to attracting applicants for GS-15
positions to meet the burgeoning needs of the Social Security
Administration.) 46
Under the leadership of its new director, Marvin Morse, the office is
attempting to step up its recruitment efforts by revising Announce-
ment No. 318 and planning workshops to stimulate the interest of
qualified women and minority applicants. 47
II. THE FUTURE OF THE ALJ's ROLE
Thirty-five years after the passage of the Administrative Procedure
Act the administrative lawjudge is a strong and flourishing institution.
Both the number of judges and the number of agencies using them
have been growing yearly. Their status and functions have been
enhanced by a long series of decisions of federal courts reviewing ad-
ministrative agency decision making. 8 And they themselves have orga-
nized an effective professional association-the Federal Adminis-
44 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 28.451d. at 3-4.461d. at 5.
47Interview with Judge Morse, director, Office of ALJs (September 1980). Judge
Morse, appointed in April 1980, is the first ALJ to serve in that post. Under his
broadened job description, he has the mandate "to provide policy guidance and lead-
ership for the nationwide Administrative Law Judge program."
"See Macy, supra note 9, at 380-82. For a comprehensive discussion see ROSENBLUM, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWJUDGE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: INTERRELATIONS OF CASE LAW
WITH STATUTORY AND PRAGMATIC FACTORS IN DETERMINING ALJ ROLES, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL
SECURITY OFTHE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94th Cong., I st Sess. (1975); SUBCOMM.
ON SOCIAL SECURITY OFTHE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., RECENT
STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS CRISIS 171-245 (Comm. Print
1975). The Supreme Court recognized the ALJs functional comparability to judges in
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,513 (1978). (ALJs have absolute immunity from liability
for damages for actions taken in their quasi-judicial capacity.)
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trative Law Judges Conference (FALJC).49 Nevertheless, in recent
years questions about the recruitment, selection, utilization, indepen-
dence, and competence of the ALJ have been asked with increasing,
rather than decreasing, frequency.
A. Action by the Civil Service Commission (OPM)
The Civil Service Commission has undertaken several efforts to
address these questions. The first of a two-stage study was commenced
in June 1973 by a study group composed of six chief ALJs and five
ALJs under the direction of Philip LaMacchia, then the deputy general
counsel of the Civil Service Commission. The "LaMacchia Committee"
was given a broad mandate to make findings pertaining to the overall
effectiveness of the ALJ program. The committee submitted its report
to the commission on July 30, 1974.
The committee recommended against a change in the application of
veterans preference to the ALJ selection program, but urged changes
in the operation of the "rule of three" 5° and of selective certification.
The committee also urged an enhanced recruitment effort and called
for greater congressional explicitness as to the need for ALJ hearings
in particular programs."
The recommendations of the LaMacchia Committee were reviewed
by a "second level" committee known as the "Advisory Committee on
Administrative Law Judges," which was established in August 19762
and held nine meetings before issuing its final report on February 14,
1978."3
This more broadly representative advisory committee formally
adopted four recommendations for approval of the commission
(although the committee discussed many other issues). It recom-
mended that ALJs be removed from the coverage of the Veterans
Preference Act, that the practice of selective certification be abandoned
49The FALJC is the only independent association of ALJs. The ABA's Section of
Judicial Administration has organized a conference of ALJs, and the numerous ALJs in
the Department of HHS have also formed their own association of ALJs.
5 See text at note 25. The committee urged a change to a rule of 10 or 15, Committee
Report, Finding 1(8) 15, 62.
"Indeed, to encourage this, the committee urged that the APA be amended "to
provide that no further statute or Executive Order which provides for a hearing shall be
deemed to require the use of ALJs absent explicit language therein that the proceedings
in question are to be subject to Sections 556 and 557 of the APA in all respects and
conducted by ALJs appointed under Section 3105." (Finding VIII(l), 56, 67-8). This
idea deserves further consideration.52See 41 Fed. Reg. 36,682 (1976).
5 ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAWJUDGES, FINAL, REPORT (1978).
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if veterans preference coverage is removed, that the commission per-
mit certain additional types of occupations to count as qualifying
experience for ALJ positions 4 and that the commission modify its
requirement pertaining to the recentness of qualifying experience.5
The commission, in 1978, published a proposal to implement the
recommendations pertaining to the experience requirements for eligi-
bility, but has taken no further action on the matter.16 The commission
did, however, undertake a systematic content validity study of its ALJ
examination process? 7 When completed, this study may result in
change in the selection process.
B. Recent Legislative Proposals
Spurred by increasing concern about regulatory costs, administra-
tive delay and bureaucratic red tape, the president and members of
Congress have proposed several major "regulatory reform" bills in the
95th and 96th Congresses. A significant component of many of these
bills has been a revamping of the ALJ system. The Senate Governmen-
tal Affairs Committee in the 95th Congress (1977-78) laid the founda-
tion for the bills with its six-volume study on federal regulation. A
portion of volume IV, Delay in the Regulatory Process, was devoted to a
description of and a suggestion for reform of the ALJ selection process
(pages 105-12). The committee's study led to the introduction in the
95th Congress of an omnibus regulatory reform bill which, in modified
form, became S. 262 in the 96th Congress. Among the bill's many
provisions is a complete revision of the ALJ selection process.
Under S. 262, (Title II, part B), as reported, the Administrative
Conference would assume the function heretofore performed by OPM
of setting qualifying standards for ALJs and maintaining the register
of eligibles. In addition, agencies would be permitted to select from the
top ten eligibles without reference to veterans preference. The bill also
provides that all ALJs appointed after the effective date of the act shall
be appointed for a term of ten years. Furthermore, a new procedure
"Specifically, the committee recommended deleting from Announcement 318's list of
excluded occupations (1) adjudicator; (2) arbitrator; (3) mediator; (4) teacher or pro-
fessor; (5) hearing officer in informal or conference proceedings; and (6) legal consul-
tant.
5 Specifically, the committee recommended that the two most recent years of qual-
ifying experience be acquired in the preceding ten years rather than the preceding seven
years. See text at note 22.
16See 43 Fed. Reg. 24,565 (1978). Legislative proposals to amend the veterans prefer-
ence provisions have, however, been supported by the commission. (See infra.)
57See SHARON, VALIDATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWJUDGE EXAMINATION (June 1980),
REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.
"Comm. Print, April 1, 1980.
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for evaluating, reappointing and removing ALJs is established by the
bill and also assigned to the Administrative Conference. The proce-
dure calls for the appointment of review boards by the chairman59 of
the Administrative Conference to aid the chairman in making deter-
minations as to reappointment. Removals of ALJs would be made
easier by the bill as well.
In the House of Representatives, a separate bill (H.R. 6768) to
reform ALJ selection and evaluation procedures was reported by the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.' H.R. 6768 maintains the
recruitment and selection function in OPM, with a consultative role
given to the Administrative Conference. It also expands the pool of
eligibles to ten, but maintains veterans preference and permits selec-
tive certification. The bill also creates a high-level, full-time perfor-
mance review board to evaluate the performance of each ALJ at least
once every six years and to handle complaints against or by ALJs.
As might be predicted, many of these proposals have been stren-
uously opposed by witnesses representing ALJ associations,6 and there
is some doubt as to whether any or all of these provisions will be
enacted by the 96th Congress. Nevertheless, these developments indi-
cate a fairly widespread perception of a need for change in the ALJ
selection process and for increased ALJ productivity.
C. Proposals for a Unified Corps of ALJs
In the last twenty-five years a number of proposals have been ad-
vanced for a unified administrative trial court, or at least a centralized
corps of judges to be used, but not employed or housed by the
agencies.2 Recently the movement has intensified. The LaMacchia
Committee, in 1973, urged the continued study of the ALJ corps
concept and suggested that expertise could be retained by creating
"divisions dealing with subjects such as transportation, ratemaking,
licensing, labor matters, and consumer protection. '63 In 1976 former
59Title IV of S. 262 also reorganizes the Administrative Conference and designates its
head as "Administrator."60H.R. 6768, as originally introduced, was the portion of the administration's regula-
tory reform bill (H.R. 3263) that related to ALJs. After hearings, the committee reported
a substitute version of the bill. Comm. Report No. 96-1186, July 23, 1980.
6'See, e.g., Statement of William Fauver on behalf of the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference, Hearings, supra note 2, at 68, and the FALJC Newsletter of April
1980, which details the Association's "battle" on behalf of its members.
"See, e.g., Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Minow, Suggestionsfor Improvement of the Administrative Process: Letter
to President Kennedy from Newton N. Minow, Chairman, Fed. Communications Comm'n, 15 AD.
L. REV. 146 (1963); HOOVER COMM'N ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, LEGAL
SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 87-88 (1955).63Comm. Report, supra note 34, at 44-47.
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ABA President Bernard Segal called for the creation of an indepen-
dent ALJ corps in a speech to the ABA." Since then, the concept has
garnered much support from ALJs themselves65 while the employing
agencies tend to oppose the idea.6" In addition, with the creation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission as adjudicative commis-
sions, staffed with ALJs and independent of the Department of Labor,
Congress has shown itself to be increasingly sensitive to the value of
having judges who are free from any influence of the enforcement
agency."
Such proposals raise structural questions that go to the heart of our
administrative process. Proponents of the corps idea bear the burden
of attending to the details of its proposed implementation. It must be
remembered that five agencies employ nearly 1,000 of the ALJs while
the remaining 24 employing agencies average only about seven
judges." The very size and balkanization of the burgeoning adminis-
trativejudiciary and the variety of matters it now handles would hinder
any attempt to rapidly transform it into a coherent corps. On the other
hand, the prospect of increased unification remains attractive because
of its potential administrative efficiency, enhancement of the percep-
tion (at least) of judicial independence, and the facilitation of unifor-
mity in administrative procedures and in productivity norms. I hope
therefore that the unified corps concept can receive intensive scrutiny
in the next several years, and that Congress can authorize a limited
experiment by which amenable agencies can draw upon a separately
appointed and administered corps of ALJs.
D. Productivity Concerns
The Administrative Conference's first report on the Uniform Case-
load Accounting System referred to the "irrepressible question of
'Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead, 62
A.B.A.J. 1424 (1976).65A GAO survey of ALJs, August 1977 showed that over 80 percent of the 754judges
responding favored the independent corps concept to a moderate, great or very great
extent. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED, 64 (May 15, 1978)
REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL TO CONGRESS. See also A Unified Corps of Administrative
LawJudges-How Will It Work, Conference of Administrative LawJudges, (ABA Sympo-
sium, January 28, 1977).
"See LaMacchia Comm. Report, supra note 34, at 45 indicating that only two agencies
expressed approval of the concept. This may be changing, however. Chairman Pert-
schuk of the FTC has said that the "idea of assigning administrative responsibility for
ALJs to a single entity.., merits further consideration." Hearings on Administrative Law
Judge System Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980).67See Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A Test
for Administrative Court Theory, 31 AD. L. REV. 177 (1979).
6'See appendix.
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whether one can evaluate ALJs' performance."6 The question is, if
anything, even more timely now, since an assumption of the above-
mentioned pending reform bills is that objective evaluation of ALJ
performance can and should be undertaken.
One of the earliest forays into this area was made by the LaMacchia
Committee, which surveyed private practitioners and government
attorneys about the overall quality of ALJs' initial decisions and the
performance of ALJs as to the time taken to write those decisions. The
results were quite inconclusive, with a majority of government attor-
neys and a minority of private practitioners finding the quality of initial
decisions to be good or superior and a slight majority of both groups
finding the time performance to be good or superior. More sophisti-
cated surveys or evaluative questionnaires, as employed by numerous
state bar associations with respect to state judges," could be used.
However, systematic evaluation of the work product of ALJs as a corps,
by agency, or by individual judge is problematic due to the potential
conflict with ALJ independence. Agency ratings of ALJs cannot be
taken into account by the Office of Personnel Management in
compensation,"2 and the "good cause" test for discipline and removal of
an ALJ has rarely been invoked. (Only ten ALJs in the history of the
corps have been formally charged and only three removed.)73
The potential tension between ALJ independence and management
initiatives was dramatically illustrated by the controversy, acrimony,
and litigation occasioned by the aggressive efforts of Robert Trachten-
berg, former director of the Social Security Administration's Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, to institute a number of management initiatives
with respect to ALJ performance.74 Among the practices most stren-
69ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEAR-
INGS-STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1975 14 (1977).70Reports were received from 54 private practitioners and 134 government attorneys.
LaMacchia Comm. Report, supra note 34, at 34-37.71See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, How BAR ASSOCIATIONS EVALUATE
SITTINGJUDGES (1976).
725 U.S.C. § 5372 (1976). See also 5 U.S.C. § 4301 (1980) which exempts ALJs from the
performance ratings prescribed for other civil servants.
"Fauver statement, supra, note 61 at 77-78. The three removals occurred in 1962,
1972, and most recently in March 1980. Six of the judges have been charged since
January 1978, mostly by the Social Security Administration. Onejudge has been charged
twice.
74For the full airing of this controversy, see SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND ISSUE
PAPER (Comm. print 1979). The remarkable bitterness that arose during this period is
illustrated therein by statements in an affidavit filed by Director Trachtenberg (Appen-
dix B): "Upon my appointment as Director in January, 1975, I discovered the most
lethargic, indifferent, unresponsive, and unaccountable organization that I have ever
seen in 15 years as a Federal employee"; and by a letter of commentary on that affidavit
by an agency official (Mr. James A. Minton, program operations officer, Region IIl) who
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uously opposed by members of the SSA ALJ corps were a peer review
program, a monthly production goal/quota and a quality assurance
program designed to identify ALJs whose decisions deviated sig-
nificantly from the agency-wide rate of reversals of initial benefit
denials.7 5
Whether or not the agency's productivity rate was enhanced by these
initiatives (and the evidence seems to indicate that it was), the agency's
morale was obviously harmed and the SSA, in a recent settlement of
one of the lawsuits engendered by the actions, has agreed to drop
mention of production figures in its training and transfer policies.7 6
Even if the Social Security Administration's management initiatives
have been slowed by the above events, other voices have urged in-
creased emphasis on management. A 1977 survey of chief ALJs on case
management procedures by the Civil Service Commission Advisory
Committee showed widely inconsistent practices in this regard. 77 In
1978, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that a system
was needed for applying personnel management techniques to admin-
istrative law judges, through the development by agencies of objective
quantitive and qualitative performance standards with periodic per-
formance evaluation by a central organization.7 1 In 1979, in a follow-up
report, the GAO reported that little had changed;79 and the American
Bar Association's Commission on Law and the Economy also urged
improved management of agency adjudications."0
A number of agencies have taken the first step to performance
evaluation by developing in-house data collection systems,"' and there
is some experience on the state level to be monitored." The data-
opened his letter (Appendix C) by stating that Mr. Trachtenberg "grossly exaggerates
and flagrantly distorts the truth in his self-serving sworn statement of September 5, 1978.
He appears intoxicated by his own press releases: thereby deluding himself in believing
that he is the Messiah whose mission was to redeem BHA of all its base and scandalous
deeds."71The Second Circuit has recently upheld the standing of an SSA ALJ to challenge
these practices, Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (remanded to district court).
7 Bono v. Social Security Administration, C.A. No. 77-0819-CV-W (W.D. Mo., settled
June 19, 1979), as cited by Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d at 16-17 n.13.
7Copies of the responses are on file at the Administrative Conference.
7 8
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT
is NEEDED (FPCD 78-25 1978).7 9COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW PROCESS: MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE (FPCD 79-44 1979).
8
°ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
101-04 (Final Report 1979).
"Agencies which have developed the most systematic in-house data collection systems
for their adjudicative activity are CAB, FERC, ICC, NLRB, and SSA.
82New Jersey has an ongoing program of evaluation of its 41 ALJs. See Rosenblum,
Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Aspects of Purpose, Policy and Feasibility (May 1980)
(Draft report for the Administrative Conference of the U.S.).
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gathering efforts of the Administrative Conference from 1975-19783
give some indication of both the potential and the difficulties inherent
in quantitive measurement of ALJ productivity." Nevertheless, if such
efforts are given increased emphasis by the high-volume adjudicative
agencies, with oversight by the Administrative Conference, I would
reaffirm the conference's premise that "given enough data and with
careful determination, over a period of several years, of what similar-
ities and differences exist among the various types of formal adminis-
trative cases processed, some method of evaluation of ALJ perfor-
mance may be feasible and useful. 8 5
III. THE ALJ PROGRAM-MENU FOR CHANGE
The following proposals are not original with me. But, in summary
form, they represent my views as to needed legislative and administra-
tive changes in the ALJ program.
A. Selection and Appointment
1. Elimination of veterans preference. The preference is unneces-
sary for veterans who are successful enough in their careers to
apply for this position. It clearly retards recruitment and is an
infringement on merit selection.
2. Modification of selective certification. The present system of
having, in effect, separate registers for specially qualified appli-
cants should be replaced by a system which permits agencies to
select from the top 10 eligibles on the main register. Rating
officials should, however, be permitted to give additional credit
to applicants with specific relevant experience. Any change in
selective certification should, however, await the elimination of
veterans preference.
3. A program allowing agencies to hire a limited number of "ad-
ministrative law examiners" at GS-13 and GS-14 for a trial
period should be instituted so as to provide a feeder group of
potential ALJs. Such examiners could be authorized to handle
non-APA cases, assist ALJs in APA cases, or even preside in
APA cases where the parties agree.
8 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEAR-
INGS-STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1975 (1977); STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978 (1980).84See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., DELAY IN THE
REGULATORY PROCESS (Committee Print 1977): "The Conference's present efforts to
collect uniform statistics from regulatory agencies is a step in the right direction, but
needs refinement, enforcement capability, permanence, and adequate funding."
85STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1975, supra note 83, at 15.
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4. The Office of Administrative Law Judges in the Office of Per-
sonnel Management should be expanded and its director given
additional status and authority. At present the office is too small
and ill-funded to adequately oversee such a large and balkan-
ized program. The office needs to be upgraded within OPM to a
status equivalent to that of the Office of General Counsel, re-
porting directly to the director of OPM. Currently the OALJ
director must report to the associate director for executive per-
sonnel and management development, one of 14 associate
directors in OPM (See OPM organizational chart, 44 Fed. Reg.
1503 (1979). If this is not done, the office or its function should
be transferred elsewhere.
5. The Office of Administrative Law Judges should continue its
effort to reevaluate its ratings process. Among other changes, it
should increase the importance given the interview panel. The
office should also enhance its recruitment efforts by improving
its informational announcements, and by broadening the cate-
gories of persons eligible for inclusion, e.g., arbitrators and law
professors.
6. A more equitable and effective procedure of determining the
salaries of ALJs needs to be adopted. One legislative solution
would be to make ALJ salaries a fixed percentage of the salaries
of Federal district judges.
B. Performance Review
1. The Chief ALJs, at agencies with more than one ALJ, should be
given the responsibility and authority to develop performance
standards for the agency'sjudges and monitor and report on the
quantitative and qualitative performance of the judges.
2. An independent, high-level, performance review board should
be established to conduct periodic performance appraisals of
ALJs, and handle complaints respecting the performance or
conduct of ALJs as well as complaints of undue interference in
ALJ duties by agency officials. The board shquld be able to take
varying degrees of disciplinary action against ALJs subject to
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, except that out-
right removal should be subject to a de novo hearing by the
board. ALJs appointments should not be for a fixed term.
3. Agencies should be required by statute to compile adequate
statistics on formal adjudications pursuant to the direction of
the Administrative Conference of the United States.
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C. Unified Corps of ALJs
1. A joint executive-legislative-judicial commission should be
established to study the feasibility and need for one or more
independent corps of ALJs or administrative courts. Experi-
ments in this vein should be authorized during the pendency of
the study.
2. The Administrative Conference should be given adequate re-
sources to study the feasibility and need for uniform rules of
practice for agency rules of practice and for a revised manual
for ALJs.
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APPENDIX
NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES SERVING, BY AGENCY
NUMBER OF ALJs
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT Jan. 1979' June 19 8 0b
Agriculture, Department of .................... 5 5
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
Bureau of (Dept. of the Treasury) ............. 1 1
Civil Aeronautics Board ....................... 17 11
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ....... 4 4
Consumer Product Safety Commission ........... 1 0'
Drug Enforcement Administration
(D ept. of Justice) ............................ 1 1
Environmental Protection Agency .............. 6 7
Federal Communications Commission ........... 14 13
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ......... 23 22
Federal Labor Relations Authority .............. 4 lod
Federal Maritime Commission .................. 7 7
Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission .................. 12 18
Federal Trade Commission .................... 12 12
Food and Drug Administration
(Dept. of H .E.W .) ........................... 1 1
Housing and Urban Development,
Departm ent of .............................. I 1
Interior, Department of the .................... 8 13'
Interstate Commerce Commission .............. 61 55
Labor, Department of ......................... 49 66
Maritime Administration
(Dept. of Commerce) ........................ 3 3
Merit Systems Protection Board ................ I If
National Labor Relations Board ................ 98 115
National Transportation Safety Board ........... 6 6
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................ I 1
Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission .................. 47 48
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Postal Rate Commission ........................ 0 0g
Securities and Exchange Commission ........... 8 7
Social Security Administration
(Dept. of H.E.W .) ........................... 660 698
U.S. Coast Guard (Dept. of Transportation) ..... 16 16
U.S. International Trade Commission ........... 2 2
U .S. Postal Service ............................ 2 2
TOTAL 1070 1146
a Data derived from "Management Improvements in the Administrative Law
Process: Much Remains to be Done," Report by the Comptroller General of the U.S.,
FPCD-79-44, May 23, 1979 (Appendix II).
b. Information obtained from Office of Administrative LawJudges, OPM,June 1980.
c Position is temporarily vacant due to a retirement.
d The FLRA was created in 1979 by the Civil Service Reform Act.
Does not include 11 GS-14 Indian Probate Judges.
The MSPB was created in 1979 by the Civil Service Reform Act. This position was
formerly located in the Civil Service Commission.
9" The position allotted to the Postal Rate Commission has been vacant since 1977.
